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I. Introduction:  
Arthur Laffer was not the first person to study the relationship between tax rates and tax 
revenues. This relationship has been debated ever since taxes were first instated to raise 
government revenue, but he is given credit for coining the widely known theoretical concept of 
the Laffer curve, which is shown in figure (1).  
Figure 1 
 
The Laffer curve provides a graphical representation of the relationship between tax rates 
and tax revenues where the tax rates of 0% and 100% provide no revenue and every other rate 
generates some revenue. On this curve, tax revenue increases with the tax rate until a certain 
point. After this point is reached, any further increase in the tax rate decreases the government’s 
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revenue. To this day, economists disagree on the overall effect of tax reforms on tax revenues 
and on the shape or even the presence of the Laffer curve.   
In order to understand the Laffer curve theory, it is necessary to understand how tax 
revenue is created. Tax revenue is a function of the tax rate times the tax base. Government 
revenue can decrease after a tax increase if the tax base falls by a large enough margin. Whether 
tax increases increase or decrease tax revenue relates to how individuals and firms respond to tax 
changes since their reactions alter the size of the tax base. However, the estimation of their 
responses to various taxes imposed by the U.S. government (the income tax, the corporate profits 
tax, etc.), has proved to be a contentious challenge. The debate over the Laffer curve and 
behavioral responses to taxation has extremely important ramifications on the policy measures 
regarding taxation that the government could adopt. It is crucial that government officials be able 
to predict the effects of a given tax reform on tax revenue so that it can accomplish the desired 
goals after enactment. This estimation is of great importance during a period of high deficits 
because the government needs to raise more revenue, and increased taxation is often seen as a 
viable way to accomplish this goal. Opponents of tax increases often cite the logic employed by 
the Laffer curve by saying that an increase in tax rates lowers or only causes a small increase in 
tax revenue because people avoid taxation, which lowers the tax base. They also say that the 
revenue effects of tax cuts are minimal. For example, the senate minority leader Mitch 
McConnell stated that there is “no evidence whatsoever that the Bush tax cuts actually 
diminished revenue”1. Proponents of increasing taxes acknowledge that individuals might take 
actions to decrease the amount of taxes they pay, but they still say that significant tax revenue 
can still be received through tax rate increases. 





This thesis attempts to contribute to this tax responsiveness literature, which studies how 
individuals respond to taxation. Many different estimates of behavioral responses to taxation 
have been made in the past thirty years. There are large differences between these estimates in 
terms of the magnitude of the responsiveness of taxpayers. The tax responsiveness literature has 
generally measured how changes in the income tax rate affect taxable income to isolate 
behavioral responses to tax rate changes. They seek to calculate an elasticity that shows how 
taxable income changes when income tax rates are raised or lowered. I do not measure 
behavioral responses directly. Instead I focus on estimating the Laffer curve. This involves 
measuring the revenue effects of tax rate changes, which encompasses the results of a behavioral 
response to taxation. To better understand the link between tax revenues and tax rates, I also seek 
to show that tax rates other than the income tax rate can have an effect on income tax revenue. 
People earn income in a variety of different forms that are all taxed at different rates. If the tax 
rate on a certain form of income increases, there is an incentive to switch income to a different 
form that is taxed at a lower rate to avoid paying additional taxes. 
Many scholars have explored this issue, but I create a comprehensive model that 
incorporates a variety of factors that could affect income tax revenue. My research seeks to show 
that income tax revenue is a function of the income tax rate and multiple other tax rates as well. 
This draws on the theory that income switching between different forms of income occurs when 
tax rates are changed. These reactions occur because an individual’s optimal economic decision 
after an income tax change involves microeconomic incentives to switch income to a different 
form to take advantage of different tax rates. After providing an intuition for the Laffer curve 
using standard microeconomics, I use data to investigate whether the Laffer curve accurately 
reflects the link between tax rates and tax revenue. The data set I use encompasses forty eight 
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years of tax return data from 1948 to 2009 to analyze general trends in tax responsiveness over a 
variety of tax rate changes. Most other scholars choose to look at individual rate change 
episodes, but I choose to analyze many years to assess tax responsiveness in the long run. 
Performing research on individual rate change episodes might produce results that do not 
describe the overall trends in the ways people respond to tax rate changes. There could be factors 
present that affect a person’s decision making during a certain period of time that are not 
apparent in other years. An economic expansion, for example, could make people more willing 
to accept a tax rate increase without any income switching response. 
The structure of this paper involves five distinct steps. First, a literature review is 
conducted to examine previous research that can offer insight onto my own methods. The 
literature review helps me identify distinct methodologies, data sets, and a variety of other 
factors that are taken into account to strengthen the research I carry out. Second, I present a 
simple theoretical model to explain how a utility maximizing individual’s reaction to tax rate 
changes can alter tax revenue. The third section outlines the methodology for the research 
conducted, including the process of data treatment as well as building the regressions used to 
model tax responsiveness. In the fourth section I test the Laffer curve theory, build regression 
equations, present the results of the regressions, and provide interpretations of each equation. 
The last section offers a discussion of the results of the research along with the ramifications of 




II. Literature Review:  
There has been extensive research conducted on individuals’ behavioral responses to 
taxation and the ramifications on tax revenue with a wide variety of results that lead to opposite 
policy conclusions. It is important to use the valuable conclusions of these studies to guide and 
shape my own research.  
The value of studying behavioral responses to tax rate changes is supported by the theory 
that there is a dead weight loss whenever individuals are taxed. Giertz (2008) provides a 
summary of the various ways that tax changes can induce a response from an individual. He 
shows that in response to a tax change, a person can alter her or his behavior by changing 
personal consumption or leisure. This reaction alters an individual’s tax liability. Changing the 
timing of income receipt also enables a person to take advantage of a favorable tax change. One 
example involves receiving income before a scheduled tax increase. Lowering an individual’s 
tax burden while keeping income constant takes place when someone either illegally evades 
taxes or legally avoids taxes. Tax evasion occurs when income is not reported to the government 
while tax avoidance occurs when an individual receives income in a form that gets favorable tax 
treatment. The administration and compliance policies of the government are additional factors 
that affect behavioral responses to tax rates because they shape the ability of people to evade or 
avoid taxes.  
There are many different ways to assess the ramifications of tax rate changes. The 
analyses carried out by Diamond (2005) and Romer and Romer (2007) take a broad perspective 
by looking at the macroeconomic effects of tax policy changes on the whole economy. Diamond 
creates a model to simulate the effects of permanently extending the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts on 
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employment, investment, and output. Romer and Romer conduct an analysis of the political 
narrative surrounding tax change episodes to tie tax changes to movements in output. These 
papers attempt to answer the question, “are tax increases or decreases good for the economy?”, 
but their main focus is not on isolating the effects of tax changes on government revenue.  
 There is a broad literature that is devoted to estimating the effect of a change in the net-
of-tax-rate on taxable income. The net-of-tax-rate is the percent of income an individual keeps 
after taxes are deducted. In these studies, the main focus is to discern what effects tax changes 
have on taxable income, which directly affects government revenue. Some authors, such as 
Canto, Joines, and Laffer (1981) argue that decreasing tax rates might actually increase 
government revenue. Unlike most other scholars they predict the direct revenue effects of a tax 
change, and they create these predictions by using a time-series model. Goolsbee (1999) and 
Saez (2004) measure the effects of net-of-tax-rate changes on taxable income and do not come to 
the same conclusion as Canto, Joines, and Laffer (1981). Although Saez (2004) does not study 
the same time period, Goolsbee (1999) shows that during the same period studied by Canto, 
Joines, and Laffer (1981), the taxpayer response to changing tax rates was not significant. 
Goolsbee (1999) also uses a difference in differences method instead of a time series regression. 
The difference in differences method compares the percent change in taxable income between 
two different groups of taxpayers who pay separate marginal tax rates. 
Feldstein (1995) points out that tax revenue can be affected by a multitude of factors 
other than just a tax rate itself. An individual’s ability to change his or her form of compensation, 
defer compensation, take fringe benefits, and many other factors could be part of the equation. 
Altering labor supply is one of the most fundamental ways that an individual can react to tax rate 
changes that would have an impact on tax revenue. Gordon and Slemrod (1998) provide an 
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interesting take on tax revenue fluctuations by asking the question “are ‘real’ responses to taxes 
simply income shifting between corporate and personal tax bases”. They bring up the issue that 
as tax rates change, individuals can shift their income to a different form that is taxed at a 
preferable rate instead of outright tax evasion or other behavioral responses. These authors 
address the central issue of income switching that I incorporate into my own analyses.  
During the period Gordon and Slemrod (1998) study, the income tax rate falls below the 
corporate tax rate, which could induce income switching behavior. The authors find convincing 
evidence that income switching behavior occurs between corporate and personal income tax 
bases. They show that a one percentage point increase in corporate income taxes relative to 
personal income taxes raises reported personal income by 3.2 %. This result is highly significant 
and points to the fact that reported income increases of a certain type could be a result of shifting 
income out of another form. This theory provides another essential underpinning for the research 
conducted for this paper in an effort to explain changes to income tax revenue in relation to other 
tax rates.  
Gordon and Slemrod (1998) find evidence that individuals respond to incentives to 
switch income between corporate and personal tax bases. When the marginal income tax rate is 
lower than the marginal corporate tax rate, individuals who have the ability change the way in 
which their corporations file taxes so that the company’s income is subject to a lower tax rate. 
Corporate, income, and capital gains taxes are the main ways in which the federal government 
raises revenue, with a small portion raised by excise taxes. It is possible that individuals react to 
changes in all three of these tax rates when they make decisions about which form to report their 
income in. Therefore, when calculating revenue that is received by the federal government for a 
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certain type of tax, it could be important to include tax rates on multiple forms of income in 
explaining government revenue movements.  
Looking into reactions to changes in tax rates other than the income tax rate is important 
for understanding how total government revenue changes when different taxes change. Auerbach 
and Poterba (1988) look into behavioral responses to capital gains tax rate changes. This form of 
income differs from wage income in that people who receive capital gains income can easily 
change the timing of their income receipt while wage income is more constant from year to year. 
Auerbach and Poterba find that impending capital gains tax changes affect the timing of capital 
gains income receipts. If capital gains taxes are set to increase for example, there would be an 
increase in the amount of capital gains income that is declared before the increase. They show 
that there is a significant short term elasticity, but there is an insignificant elasticity in the long 
term.  
Although some people might react to changes in tax rates, this is not true for the whole 
population. Certain individuals only receive income in one form, wage income for example, and 
therefore do not have the ability to switch income to a different form. Additionally, not all those 
who receive income in different forms can switch willingly between them. Labor supply 
reactions could also differ after a tax rate change. If the income tax rate increases proportionally 
for someone who earns $30,000 and someone who earns $1,000,000, the person with the higher 
income could sacrifice some of their income for increased leisure. On the other hand, the poorer 
person might not have that option since they might need all of their income to cover basic 
expenses and could not allot extra leisure time.   
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The literature addressing behavioral responses of individuals to tax rates has generally 
found that higher income individuals have stronger reactions to tax rate changes. Goolsbee 
(1999) analyzes the responses of high income earners to various tax rate changes while Saez 
(2004) notes that  only the top 1% of earners respond to tax rate changes from 1960-2000. 
Feldstein (1995) and Lindsey (1987) also find the highest responsiveness rates with income 
earners at the top of the marginal tax rate scale. This evidence leads to the conclusion that when 
studying tax rate responsiveness, higher income earners should be focused on. Those who are in 
the top quintile hold a disproportionate share of the stock and bonds in the U.S. so they are more 
likely to report capital gains income. Higher income individuals also have more tools at their 
disposal to take part in tax avoidance or outright tax evasion. If an individual earns $1,000,000 
per year then he or she has a strong incentive to avoid a higher tax rate on income earned over 
$400,000. For the purpose of this paper, only data on high income earners is used to isolate the 
most prevalent forms of tax responsiveness.  
  In order to study individual responses to tax rate changes, tax return data needs to be 
analyzed to assess the necessary trends. IRS data is generally the most widely cited source used 
by scholars to analyze tax responsiveness. The data on tax returns from before 1960 is not as 
complete as modern data because there is no data on individual level tax returns. Goolsbee 
(1999) addresses this problem by analyzing annual histograms on Statistics of Income produced 
by the IRS, which give the total income reported for several income classes. The data he uses is 
cross sectional, which measures many subjects over one period of time. Since Feldstein (1995) 
analyzes more modern tax rate change episodes, he has access to a set of panel data, which tracks 
the same individuals before and after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. This data has an advantage in 
that Feldstein can study the same group of people, which lets him isolate that group’s 
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responsiveness. Panel data has been used under the assumption that it can control for non-tax 
related changes in reported income but Saez (2004) says that it might not control for changing 
income inequality. He shows however that while some scholars choose repeated cross sectional 
data, that panel data can be more useful for the study of income mobility. Canto et al. (1981) 
provide a different approach by creating a model that can incorporate time series data.  
 Previous scholars have assessed the results of behavioral responses to tax rate changes by 
estimating a Laffer curve. Canto et al. (1981) provide a theoretical model of a Laffer curve to 
prove that there is a tax rate that maximizes government revenue and any tax rate above that 
would decrease revenue. Although they do not provide a model based on data to create a Laffer 
curve for the U.S., others have done so. Trabandt and Uhlig (2006) estimate a Laffer curve for 
the U.S. using a neoclassical growth model while Hsing (1996) uses a quadratic regression to 
model the Laffer curve. Like these scholars, I try to create a Laffer curve model to represent the 
revenue implications of tax rate changes in the U.S.  Trabandt and Uhlig (2006) make the point 
that the revenue maximizing tax rate is not often a goal sought by governments because it is not 
the rate at, which welfare is maximized. Raising the tax rate to the revenue maximizing rate 
could have harmful effects on the economy. Because of this, the authors argue that governments 
should set the tax rate below the revenue maximizing point in order to improve overall well-
being.  The empirical literature, however, generally calculates elasticities to measure behavioral 
responsiveness to tax rates instead of a Laffer curve. Goolsbee (1999), Feldstein (1995), Lindsey 
(1987), and many others calculate the elasticity of taxable income related to the net-of-tax rate. 
Goolsbee (1999) points to the importance of this tool because it shows the dead weight loss of a 
certain tax and its revenue implications. He also mentions that the conventional Laffer curve 
does not exist in an easily determinable form because of our marginal tax rate structure.  
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For the conventional Laffer curve to exist, our tax rate structure would have to be flat. 
When the tax rate is changed and a flat tax rate is imposed, every dollar that an individual earns 
is taxed at the new rate. This could incite a behavioral response where an individual works less 
under the new tax rate if she or he deems it to be unfairly high. With a progressive tax rate 
structure people face different incentives with respect to the schedule of tax rates. If the top 
marginal tax rate is raised, individuals have an incentive to avoid the increased tax on income 
subject to the higher marginal rate. However, an individual does not change her or his behavior 
regarding income that is subject to a lower rate that was not changed during the tax reform. 
Therefore any labor supply response is limited to the labor used to earn income subject to the tax 
rate being changed. Behavioral responses under a progressive tax rate structure would only 
resemble those under a flat tax rate structure if all marginal tax rates changed proportionately 
during a tax reform. This does not mean that the Laffer curve does not exist, but it shows the 
value of calculating elasticities given the American tax structure.  
The methods that others have used to measure individual responsiveness to tax rate 
changes have varied widely over the past twenty five years. They can vary depending on the time 
period that a scholar chooses to analyze and they also vary depending on the type of technology 
available with computers being the most important technology. Canto et al. (1981) build a time-
series model and fit it to the data surrounding tax rate changes to create elasticity estimates. 
Lindsey (1987) uses two separate cross sections of data and uses a difference-in-differences 
method of study to create elasticities. He does this by comparing individuals in two different 
time periods that he ranks by adjusted gross income. The regression equations that are calculated 
are specified in the log-log functional form because this functional form generates elasticities for 
the independent variables. Feldstein (1999) compares changes in taxable income to changes in 
14 
 
the net-of-tax-rate using a difference-in-differences calculation similar to Lindsey’s except that 
he uses panel data and not cross sectional data.  Goolsbee (1999) makes difference-in-difference 
calculations as well, but he has to revert back to separate cross sectional samples since he does 
not have any panel data available. He also uses log-log equations to estimate the elasticity of 
taxable income with respect to tax rates. Saez (2004) takes an approach more similar to Canto by 
creating a time-series model while using the log-log functional form to gain elasticity estimates. 
Like Saez (2004), Goolsbee (1999), and Feldstein (1995) I also use a log-log functional form to 
try to explain the revenue implications of tax rate changes. He notes that serial correlation is a 
problem with this approach and that Newey-West standard errors need to be computed to 
mitigate this issue.  
The literature that estimates the elasticities of taxable income related to net-of-tax-rates 
has produced a wide variety of results with greatly varying policy implications. In articles where 
the marginal income tax has been the point of focus, the work of Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein 
(1995)  is noted for the high elasticities that are reported from their analyses of tax rate changes 
in the 1980’s. In general, Lindsey finds elasticities of 1.6-1.8 with the highest estimates ranging 
up to 2.5 for the highest income earners. Feldstein’s study produces similarly high elasticity 
estimates that range from 1.04 to 3.05. Although the largest elasticities relate to the responses of 
top income earners, elasticities that are this high have severe policy ramifications. A 
consequence of these findings is that higher income earners were on the right side of the Laffer 
curve during this period when a tax increase (decrease) would decrease (increase) government 
revenue. Feldstein predicted that the 1993 tax increase would only slightly increase revenue and 
that the treasury could experience losses for high income taxpayers. These two influential articles 
support the conclusions of Canto et al. (1981) that “increases in tax rates could as well reduce as 
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increase government tax revenues.” The tax cuts that occurred during the 1980’s seemingly 
created a win-win situation for the public and for the government. People got taxed at a lower 
rate while the government got more tax revenue.  
Recent literature, however, has not supported the conclusions made by Feldstein and 
Lindsey. Goolsbee’s (1999) goal is to mimic the work of Lindsey and Feldstein whose work he 
categorizes with others studying the 1980’s tax cuts. He names this literature “New Tax 
Responsiveness” literature or NTR and says that the authors contributing to this body of research 
support the Laffer curve theory and claim that there is little or no revenue to be gained by raising 
taxes. Goolsbee points out that comparing high income people to lower income individuals with 
the difference-in-differences calculation could lead to biased elasticity estimates. Yet, he states 
that his work is not a critique but an extension of the methodology of NTR scholars to other tax 
changes to see if the same elasticities are present in different time periods. Goolsbee studies five 
tax rate changes from 1920 to 1966 and his results show that the findings of NTR literature are 
not typical. He produces elasticity estimates generally ranging from 0.2 to 0.7 while sometimes 
finding negative elasticities.  
Saez (2004) also produces results that would support the elasticity estimates that 
Goolsbee (1999) finds.  He points out that only comparing data comprising the years directly 
before and after a tax change could reveal a short term elasticity when a long term elasticity 
might actually be different. Also income inequality increased greatly during the 1980’s, which 
could have biased the elasticity estimates of high income earners upward. Saez (2004) introduces 
a time trend in his regressions to control for income inequality and produces elasticity estimates 
generally ranging from 0.6-0.7. These findings show that the high elasticities found for the 
1980’s tax reforms are most likely not indicative of general elasticity estimates since they might 
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be inflated due to an increased share of income accruing to wealthy income earners. Table (1) 
provides a summary of the papers that estimate elasticities as well as the paper by Canto, Joines, 
and Laffer (1981) that predicts future tax revenue. This table represents the evidence that other 
scholars have uncovered about the presence of a Laffer curve in the U.S. 
Table 1: Literature Summary 
Article Data Findings 
Canto, 
Joines, Laffer 
(1981)                                           
Dependent Variable:   
Income Tax Revenue    
Key Independent Variable: 
Income Tax Rates                                                   
Years Covered: 1951-1964                                           
Unit of Analysis: Group (all 
taxpayers in time series 
data sets) 
Summary of Results: Through their regression simulation, the authors find 
that in the years following 1964, decreasing tax rates could raise tax revenue. 
This points to the presence of the Laffer curve during this time period and 
implies that the U.S. was on the right side of this curve. 
Lindsey 
(1987) 
Dependent Variable:  
Taxable Income        
Key Independent Variable: 
Top marginal income tax 
rate                                                                                      
Years Covered: 1980-1984                                      
Unit of Analysis: Group (all 
taxpayers in cross 
sectional data sets) 
Summary of Results: The author obtains elasticity estimates of 1.6 to 1.8 for 
the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the top marginal tax rate. 
Lindsey finds the greatest responsiveness to tax rate changes in high income 
earners. He shows that the U.S. is on the right side of the Laffer curve during 















Taxable Income                 
Years Covered: 1985 and 
1988                       
Key Independent Variable: 
Top marginal income tax 
rate                                                                                 
Unit of Analysis: Group 
(taxpayers in the specific 
panel data set) 
Summary of Results: Feldstein creates elasticity estimates of 1.04 to 3.05 for 
the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the marginal tax rate. He also 
finds increased tax rate responsiveness in high income earners. These 
elasticities show that the U.S. is on the right side of the Laffer curve during 
this time period. The author predicts that the 1993 tax increases should only 




Taxable Income           
Key Independent Variable: 
Top marginal income tax 
rate     
Years Covered: 1922-1926, 
1931-1938, 1948-1952, 
1962-1966                                            
Unit of Analysis: Group (all 
taxpayers in cross 
sectional data sets) 
Summary of Results: Goolsbee creates elasticity estimates of 0.0 to 0.7 for the 
elasticity of taxable income with respect to the top marginal tax rate. These 
findings do not show any evidence of a Laffer curve in the U.S. during these 
time periods. These elasticities show that the percentage decrease in taxable 
income after a tax increase will not be as large as a one percent increase in 
the tax rate. This shows that tax revenue will still increase if tax rates increase. 




Income share of top decile 
of income earners 
(multiple groups of 
income shares were used) 
Key Independent 
Variables: Top marginal 
tax rates, Time trends to 
control for exogenous 
factors that affect taxable 
income                                                            
Years Covered: 1960-2000                                      
Unit of Analysis: Individual 
(tax unit) 
Summary of Results:  Saez produces long-term elasticity estimates of 0.6-0.7 
for the elasticity of the top 1% income share with respect to the top marginal 
tax rate. He only finds tax rate responsiveness in the top 1% of income 
earners. These findings also do not show evidence of the Laffer curve because 
the elasticities are less than one.  The elasticities that Saez calculates show 
that the percentage decrease in the top 1% income share after a tax increase 
will not be as large as a one percent increase in the tax rate. This shows that 
tax revenue will still increase if tax rates increase. Saez does not find evidence 
that there are negative revenue effects of tax rate increases. 
 
This table shows that there is conflicting evidence regarding behavioral responses to 
taxation in the U.S. Feldstein (1995), Lindsey (1987), and Canto, Joines, and Laffer (1981) show 
that tax increases can have a negative effect on tax revenue. This points to the presence of a 
Laffer curve during the time periods that these scholars study. Goolsbee (1999) and Saez (2004), 
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however, come to quite different conclusions. They find that tax rates are positively related to tax 
revenues, which does not support the Laffer curve theory. My research modeling the Laffer 




III. Theoretical Background: 
Before directly estimating the Laffer curve, we need to understand behavioral responses 
to taxation, which potentially explain the shape of the curve. It is important to first take a step 
back and asses how individuals make decisions regarding consumption and leisure. This 
provides a theoretical basis that explains why individuals change their behavior when a tax rate 
is raised or lowered. Taxation distorts the optimal choices of an individual when after tax prices 
change. This distortion can manifest itself in two ways. Taxes on labor income can change an 
individual’s marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure in the present. Also, 
capital gains taxation can alter an individual’s marginal rate of substitution between consumption 
in the present and consumption in the future. Therefore, microeconomic theory supports Laffer’s 
idea that changes in the tax base occur in response to tax changes. In the following analyses I 
show why individuals respond to changes in taxes on both labor and capital income. I assume 
that interest rates and wages are fixed to isolate the effects of tax rate changes. 
 Microeconomic theory represents the standard choice of individuals between 
consumption and leisure. Rational individuals strive to maximize their utility, which is a function 
of these two variables. Graphically an individual’s optimal choice between leisure and 
consumption occurs when the indifference curve representing individual preferences is tangent to 
the budget constraint. It denotes the fact that the choice of the individual is both on the highest 
possible indifference curve and affordable. At the optimum, this point represents the marginal 
rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. This equals the rate at, which the market 
trades leisure for consumption, the negative of the after tax wage, which is presented in equation 
(1). UL represents the marginal utility of leisure, UC represents the marginal utility of 













Before tax rates are changed, an individual’s marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and leisure is assumed to be at MRS1. If labor income taxes increase, the after tax 
wage decreases and consumption becomes more expensive relative to leisure. This triggers a 
substitution effect away from consumption towards leisure. On the graph, the change in the labor 

















optimal response yields a new marginal rate of substitution, MRS2, which represents a new 
valuation of consumption versus leisure. As a result individuals take more leisure time and work 
less to remain at the same level of utility. When the level of consumption and the number of 
hours worked decline, the tax base for labor income taxation shrinks.  
 The microeconomic theory that represents the tradeoffs between consumption in the 
present and consumption in the future is similar to the theory supporting the previous example. 
Rational individuals seek to maximize their utility by maximizing consumption over their 
lifetimes. As a simplification, I represent a lifetime as two distinct periods that individuals value 
equally. This optimal choice between consumption in two different periods occurs when the 
indifference curve representing individual preferences of consumption in period one and 
consumption in period two is tangent to the budget constraint. At the optimum, the marginal rate 
of substitution between consumption in period one and consumption in period two is presented in 
equation (2). This equals the negative of the inverse of one plus the after-tax return on capital. 
UC1 represents the marginal utility of consumption in period one, UC2 represents the marginal 
utility of consumption in period two, and  represents the after tax return on capital. 
(2)  
 




Graph (2) shows how individuals react when a tax on capital income changes the after-










Before tax rates are changed an individual’s marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption in period one and consumption in period two is assumed to be at MRS3. If tax rates 
on capital are increased then the after tax return on capital goes down. This causes consumption 
in the first period to increase in value relative to consumption in the second period. Graphically, 
the change in the relative price of consumption results in a change of the slope of the budget 
constraint from line (3) to line (4). In order to maintain the same level of utility, individuals 
increase first period consumption and decrease second period consumption. As a result, an 

















after tax return on capital decreases, and an individual saves less in the present. Since saving 
decreases, the base for capital income taxes declines. 
 The Laffer curve theory shows that these behavioral responses to taxation occur at every 
tax rate, but the magnitude of each behavioral response differs. For example, when the tax rate 
increases from zero to five percent an individual’s marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and leisure will change, but this response will most likely not cause income tax 
revenue to fall because it is relatively small. Changing the tax rate from thirty to eighty percent, 
however, could cause a much larger behavioral response that could decrease tax revenue. Tax 
revenue changes can be better understood by reviewing the factors that affect tax revenue. Tax 
revenue equals the tax rate times the tax base. Equivalently, the percent change in tax revenue is 
equal to the percent change in the tax rate plus the percent change in the tax base. The upward 
sloping section of the Laffer curve shows that until the revenue maximizing point, the percentage 
change in the tax rate will be larger than the percentage change in the tax base. On this part of 
the curve the magnitude of behavioral responses to taxation, in the form of decreasing taxable 
income, is still smaller than the percent increase in the tax rate. Therefore increasing tax rates 
will increase tax revenue. The right side of the curve is where the magnitude of the behavioral 
responses to taxation becomes greater than the percent increase in the tax rate. This causes the 
Laffer curve to slope downward and shows that revenue will decrease if tax rates are raised.  
 In order to judge the revenue effects of these behavioral responses, it is helpful to view 
the government accounting equation, which is presented in equation (3). In this example I 
exclude all taxes other than the tax on labor income and the tax on capital. R represents total 
revenue, Tw represents the tax on wages, H represents hours worked, Tk represents the tax on 
capital, and K represents capital.  
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(3) R = TwH + TkK 
When a tax increase occurs, this equation can be used to judge if the tax change raises or 
decreases tax revenue. If the decrease in the tax base is larger than the increase in the tax rate 
then total revenue decreases. In the following sections, I develop various versions of equation (3) 
to assess the magnitude of behavioral responses to taxation and ultimately determine how tax 




IV. Methodology:  
1. Overview:  
In contrast with a large section of the literature, I directly estimate the Laffer curve. I 
incorporate some key elements from the papers mentioned in the literature review into my own 
statistical models. I focus on all tax units who were subject to a marginal income tax rate at or 
above the 29% rate during the period being studied. Most scholars who have studied this topic 
have focused on the elasticity of taxable income related to the net-of-tax-rate. This research 
attempts to estimate the government revenue implications of tax rate changes. Instead of using 
taxable income as the dependent variable in regressions, I use income tax revenue. This is similar 
to the approach of Canto, Joines, and Laffer (1981) who use income tax revenue as the 
dependent variable in the regressions they create. Like Feldstein (1999) and many other scholars, 
I use the top marginal tax rate as an independent variable to explain movements in government 
income tax revenue. This method shows the direct effect of changes in income tax rates on tax 
revenue. In this case, the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to the income tax rate is obtained 
as a variable coefficient. This elasticity shows the impact of a one percentage point increase in 
the tax rate on tax revenue, and it encompasses the response of individuals to tax rate changes. I 
also draw a great deal from the article by Saez (2004). Like him, I create a time series model, but 
my data set includes eight more years of data.  
 Another way that this research differs from previous studies is that I include a variety of 
tax rates as independent variables in a model that are used to explain movements in tax revenue. 
This draws on the conclusions of Gordon and Slemrod (1998), who show that that people switch 
income between personal and corporate tax bases so that their earnings are subject to a favorable 
tax rate. Since individuals switch income between corporate and personal tax bases, the 
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corporate tax rate is included as an independent variable. The capital gains tax rate is also 
included as an independent variable because high income earners garner a large portion of their 
income through capital gains. If the capital gains tax rate is lower than the income tax rate then 
individuals have an incentive to receive capital gains income instead of wage income. In this 
thesis I create various models that are used to assess the revenue implications of tax rate changes 
along with income switching behavior.   
2. Data: 
Data gathering provides the fundamental building blocks for any estimation or modeling 
effort, but before this can occur, the type of data that needs to be found has to be specified. The 
goal of this study is to assess a period including multiple tax rate changes, not just a single 
episode, so time series data is necessary to carry out this analysis. Canto et al. (1981) and Saez 
(2004) both use a time series methodology to create elasticity estimates. Carrying out a time 
series analysis requires historical data on tax returns, and I strive to use the largest data set 
possible to incorporate many important tax rate changes. Since one of the main goals of this 
project is to test how well the Laffer curve represents behavioral responses to tax rate changes, 
data on marginal income tax rates and income tax revenue has to be procured. In an effort to 
study income switching behavior, historical data on capital gains tax rates and corporate tax rates 
is also necessary. The data for marginal income tax rates and corporate tax rates that I use is put 
together by the tax foundation2. I procure the data for capital gains income tax rates and the 
yearly percentage of all tax revenue received at or above the 29% marginal rate using the tax 





policy center database3. I also use the IRS4 and the Congressional Budget Office databases5 to 
get the data for income tax revenue and average tax rates respectively.  
 I use the highest marginal income tax rate because as Saez (2004) and others have stated, 
tax responsiveness is highest for those who have the greatest incomes and these people are 
subject to the highest marginal rate. This same explanation is expanded to encompass the use of 
the highest corporate tax rate as well. Corporations that are subject to the highest marginal tax 
rate have a large incentive to avoid taxes so that profits are taxed at a lower rate. The corporate 
tax rate from 1958-1978 had a surtax imposed on the marginal tax rate related to the highest 
bracket of corporate income. This surtax has been incorporated into the values for the highest 
marginal corporate tax rate for those years. The surtax increased the tax burden of corporations 
and it needs to be included in the corporate tax rate because it could have induced a behavioral 
response to increased taxation. A surtax is a tax imposed above and beyond the marginal tax rate 
already present. Take for example a marginal tax rate of 10%. If a surtax of 10% is imposed on 
the marginal tax rate, then anyone subject to this marginal rate would pay an additional 10% of 
the marginal tax rate. This would equate to increasing the marginal tax rate by 1%.   
 The historical values for various tax rates are readily available, but gathering data on 
income tax revenues is an entirely different task. Data on total revenue generated from income 
taxes are published by the IRS and other sources, but under the scope of this project, that 
variable is not sufficient. Since high income taxpayers are the most likely people to react to tax 
changes, the tax revenue that they produce is what needs to be gathered to assess the revenue 
effects of behavioral responses to taxation. If total tax revenue were used, tax revenue generated 









by other taxpayers who do not react to tax rate changes could dilute or hide the real responses of 
high income taxpayers. Ideally, there would be data tracking high income taxpayers over an 
extended period of time that shows the tax revenue that they produce, but this information is not 
publicly available. Even though it cannot be assured that the same people are always represented 
in a given sample because of income changes throughout time, the general reactions of high 
income earners as a whole is still be taken into account.   
 In order to isolate the reactions of high income tax payers, it is important to only analyze 
the revenue that they produce. Since marginal tax rates vary by income, only using the 
government revenue produced from income at or above certain marginal tax rates can offer the 
necessary data. The Tax Policy center has a useful data set that shows the percentage of income 
tax generated at each marginal tax rate from 1958 to 2009. The regression analysis is based on 
this time period because this is the smallest data set. These percentages can then be multiplied by 
the total income tax revenue for each year to get the amount of revenue generated at each 
marginal tax rate. 
 Even though changing top marginal tax rates creates an environment where behavioral 
responses to taxation can occur, there is also a problem associated with these changes. Over time 
the tax code has become less progressive, which means that top marginal tax rates have generally 
decreased, but the number of people included in these top brackets has grown. This base 
broadening could create biased elasticity estimates because revenue generated at the top marginal 
tax rate could increase after a tax cut because more people are in a given tax bracket. If this is the 
case, it could appear that a revenue change associated with a behavioral response to the tax cut 
occurs since revenue increases after the cut when it is only a result of taxing more people at that 
rate. To control for these possible biasing effects of changing the top marginal tax rate, the best 
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solution is to look at the same group of people over time. Since the necessary data is not 
available to do this a different strategy needs to be taken. For nearly the whole time period this 
data set represents, top marginal tax rates do not fall below twenty nine percent. Including all of 
the income generated at and above the twenty nine percent marginal income tax bracket would 
mediate some of the effects of a changing tax base. Although this no longer only samples the 
highest income earners, it reduces the percent change in tax base during a given tax reform. The 
changes in the tax base for those who are subject to the twenty nine percent marginal tax rate or 
above vary less than the tax base changes for those subject to the top marginal tax rate.  
Admittedly, this includes income earners in the sample who are not subject to the top 
marginal tax rate even though the top marginal tax rate is an independent variable in the 
regression. This is a drawback of using the larger sample of taxpayers by assessing government 
tax revenue at or above the twenty nine percent marginal tax rate bracket. Not taking this step 
however, would most likely cause a significant upward bias in the regression results. I believe 
the positive aspects of taking this approach outweigh the negative aspects.  
This method also excludes three years from the data set, which are 1988-1990. This 
decision is being made because it is the best alternative in a situation in which only limited data 
is available. The downsides to removing this data are far greater than the benefits of keeping it in 
the data set. This is because during these three years the top marginal tax rate falls below 29%. 
Using the data currently available, keeping these three years would necessitate the inclusion of 
all of the tax revenue generated at and above the 16% marginal tax rate. The goal of this thesis is 
to assess the responsiveness of tax revenues to marginal tax rates, and it has been shown in many 
scholarly articles that the top tier of income earners shows the greatest response to tax rate 
increases. Therefore, in order to best represent the revenue response to a tax rate change in an 
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econometric regression, only revenue generated at and above the highest marginal tax rate that 
the data presents should be included in the regression. If these three years were included in the 
data set, the accuracy of the results would be offset because of the sizeable amount of revenue 
generated historically from the 16% to 28% marginal tax rates. Empirical results have shown that 
this tax bracket shows little, if any responsiveness to tax rate changes. This data set is also 
missing the values for the year 1978. As a result this year also has to be excluded from the 
regression analysis.  
To check different theories of the relationship between tax rates and tax revenues, a series 
of regressions are run where the top marginal income tax rate is lagged. This tests the theory that 
people cannot immediately react to marginal tax rate changes and that it takes time to either 
adjust income or labor supply. To test these assumptions, the tax revenue from any given year is 
matched with the top marginal tax rate from the year before so that past tax rates can explain tax 
revenue movements. Various lags are be used to examine, which number of years (a lag of one, 
two, or three years for example) has the greatest explanatory power. 
3. Statistical Treatment: 
After the data is properly inspected and formatted, I use regression software to create 
equations that model the relationships between variables. In this case the software that is used is 
GRETL, which is similar to the more commonly known STATA program. The coefficient for the 
variable, which relates to the top marginal income tax rate is of particular importance in log-log 
regressions because it is the elasticity of the tax revenue with respect to the tax rate. A table of 
results is also created for each equation, which is necessary for the interpretation of the 
regression results and can point to any issues in the data that need to be addressed.  
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The most important aspect of creating regression equations is making sure that they are 
specified in the correct functional form. Various theories about the relationship between tax rates 
and tax revenues can be tested to see, which form most accurately models the data. Testing the 
Laffer curve requires the use of the quadratic functional form, which fits the supposed shape of 
the Laffer curve. If the Laffer curve theory holds true then the quadratic functional form will 
show significant results supporting the notion that an upside down parabolic model is the best 
way to model this relationship. The Laffer curve theory states that increasing income tax rates 
increases tax revenues at a decreasing rate until increasing taxes actually decreases tax revenues. 
To model this relationship, both a top marginal income tax rate variable and the same variable 
raised to the second power are included as independent variables to create a quadratic equation.  
After testing the Laffer curve using the quadratic functional form, the log-log functional 
form is used as well. As noted earlier, this is one of the most commonly used functional forms 
for relating tax rate changes to tax revenue. Saez (2004), Goolsbee (1999), and many others have 
referenced the usefulness of this functional form because the coefficients produced using this 
functional form are elasticities. This allows for the direct interpretation of the effect that an 
independent variable has on the dependent variable in percentage terms holding all other 
variables constant. The log-log functional form also compares the percentage change in the 
independent variables to the percentage change in the dependent variable. Comparisons of this 
nature are useful when the value changes in the variables might vary greatly while the percent 
change could show a smaller variance. Since tax rates only vary slightly in absolute value 
compared to tax revenue, the log-log functional form could be pertinent for addressing the actual 
relationship between these variables without providing biased results that might be produced 
through comparing the actual values of the variables.  
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One of the most common and important problems with time series regressions is the 
presence of serial correlation. Studenmend (2006) points out that this phenomenon occurs when 
the error terms of a regression are correlated, and it can cause serious problems with the validity 
of the regression output. In particular it leads to the creation of t-scores that are unreliable 
because they are artificially inflated by serial correlation. If this issue is present, the significance 
of the individual t-scores cannot be trusted. Therefore I correct for serial correlation using a 
special program in Gretel software. This option can be selected before running a regression that 
computes Newey-West standard errors that take account for the effects of serial correlation. It 
creates t-scores that are not biased upwards, which yields accurate results. When serial 
correlation is detected in a regression then Newey-West standard errors are computed to correct 
for this problem. Choosing the HAC standard errors option in Gretel creates these standard errors 






1. Motivation for Regressions:  
The main goal of this thesis is to assess and model the revenue effects of tax rate changes. 
The popular notion of the Laffer curve is often cited to describe the way people react to tax rate 
changes, but Goolsbee (1999) and others show that there are other, more accurate ways to more 
model this relationship. A thorough analysis of tax return data and simple models can show the 
trends that explain how people react to tax rate changes. The regressions below take on a variety 
of different functional forms that encompass different theories used to describe tax rate 
responsiveness. First, the log-log functional form (natural log) is used since it has been cited by 
scholars such as Feldstein (1995) to accurately model behavioral responses to tax rate changes. 
After that, the quadratic functional form is used to try and model the Laffer curve using tax data. 
The sequence of regressions presented below maps out the process of examining many 
regressions with different functional forms and variables to see, which one can most precisely 
represent the trends in the data.  
2. Functional Forms 
Log-log Functional Form: This functional form is very useful because it can be used to compare 
variables that vary greatly in size. It compares the percent changes between variables, which 
could provide more accurate results when comparing two variables that vary greatly in 
magnitude such as tax rates and GDP. Also, in a log-log regression equation, Studenmund (2006) 
shows that each regression coefficient can be interpreted as the percent change in the dependent 
variable divided by the percent change in the independent variable, which creates an elasticity. 
Auerbach and Poterba (1988) use a log-log regression to show a relationship between the 
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marginal tax rate and capital gains realizations while generating an elasticity that highlights the 
relationship. Saez (2004) also mentions log-log equations in the generation of elasticities for 
research purposes.  
Quadratic Functional Form: This is the functional form that represents the Laffer curve, which 
takes the form of an upside-down parabola. The theory that supports this regression states that as 
tax rates increase, tax revenue also increases at a decreasing rate until a maximum revenue point. 
After the maximum revenue point is reached, any further increase in tax rates decreases tax 
revenue at an increasing rate. Since the utility of every pre-tax dollar earned decreases as tax 
rates increase, individuals does not put in as much effort to earn more money as the tax rate 
increases. After the tax rate increases beyond its revenue maximizing point, individuals work 
less and use more of their time for leisure activities instead of labor. When the tax rate passes the 
revenue maximizing point, the marginal utility of consumption falls below the marginal utility of 
leisure, and individuals start to substitute leisure for consumption at an increasing rate. These 
actions would serve to decrease overall tax revenue.  
3. Regression Output Values:  
The regression software used to obtain the regression equations presented below 
produces a table below the regression with a series values associated with various tests done on 
the regression data. Many of these statistics are necessary for the interpretation of the regression 
results, and the relevant ones need to be defined to show why they add any insight. 
T-ratio: The t-test that produces the t-ratio is used to test if an individual regression variable can 
significantly explain movement in the dependent variable. Studenmund (2006) shows that the t-
ratio needs to be examined to see if an individual variable is a relevant addition to a regression 
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equation. A t-ratio needs to be greater than a certain critical value to show that a variable is 
relevant. If the critical value for a variable is 2.2 for example, an actual t-score of 2.77 would 
show that the variable significantly explains movement in the dependent variable.  
P-value: The p-test that produces the p-value is an alternative to the t-test. The p-value of a given 
t-score shows the probability of observing a t-score that is of equal or greater value when the 
regression coefficient is not actually significant. There is always a chance that the regression 
software will show a significant t-value when an independent variable is not significant and the 
p-value shows the likelihood of that happening. Studenmund (2006) shows that low p-values are 
sought after because they show that there is a small chance that the variable in question is not 
significant. The numerical value of a low p-score would be below .05.  
Adjusted R-squared: The adjusted R-squared value represents the percentage variation of the 
dependent variable around its mean that can be explained by the regression equation. It is 
adjusted for the number of coefficients in the equation. This value provides an indicator of how 
well the regression equation fits the data points. Studenmund (2006) shows that adjusting for the 
number of coefficients is important because coefficients have to be relevant for them to increase 
the adjusted R-squared value.  
Durbin Watson Statistic: The Durbin Watson Statistic can be used to measure serial correlation 
in a regression. Studenmund (2006) says that serial correlation can be a problem because it can 
lead to biased (often inflated) t-scores although it does not change the values of the coefficients. 
The time series data used in this research produces serial correlation because as data grows over 
time, it often creates a pattern of increasing error terms. Serial correlation can be detected if the 
Durbin Watson statistic for a regression is below a certain critical value. The critical value 
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depends on the number of observations and the number of independent variables in a regression. 
Every regression that I run shows evidence of serial correlation because the Durbin Watson 
statistics produced are all lower than the respective critical value, which shows evidence of serial 
correlation. In order to remedy this problem, the Newey-West (or HAC) standard errors are 
computed for all of the regressions to correct for the adverse impacts of serial correlation. 
Statistically Significant: If a variable is statistically significant, it means that the effect it has on 
the dependent variable is most likely not due to chance. This means that there is an underlying 
relation between the two variables where the movement in an independent variable explains 
movement in the dependent variable.  
4. Coefficient Interpretations: 
In the log-log regressions, the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. The 
coefficients show the effect on the dependent variable in percentage terms of a one percent 
change in an independent variable holding all other variables constant. For instance the 
coefficient 3.61 on GDP in equation (8) shows that a one percent change in GDP will change 
income tax revenue by 3.61 percent. Although every variable in the logarithmic regressions has a 
coefficient that can be interpreted in this way, the only coefficient that has been used by previous 
researchers is a coefficient similar to the one for the top marginal income tax rate. I include other 
variables in the regression equations to control for other factors that could affect income tax 
revenue that are not explained by the top marginal tax rates. If the other variables that I add are 
of the expected sign and significant then they serve the desired purpose in the regression. Since 
the focus of this thesis is to assess the effects of income tax rate changes on income tax revenue 
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the top marginal income tax rate coefficient is the only coefficient that will be interpreted with 
respect to its policy implications.  
It is important to understand how to interpret the regression coefficients produced in the 
output tables for the quadratic formula. In equation (10), if TMI increases by one unit, tax 
revenue increases by β1 plus two times β2 times TMI. The sign of β2 determines if the function is 
concave or convex. If β2 is negative, the function is convex (like the Laffer curve). For equations 
(10), (11), and (12) representing the Laffer curve, the data for income tax revenue are denoted in 
thousands of dollars so the coefficients for the variables in the quadratic regressions are in 
thousands as well. The GDP variable is denoted in billions of dollars so a one unit increase in 
GDP means increasing GDP by one billion dollars.  
5. Definition of variables: 
IR = income tax revenue generated at or over the 29% marginal income tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
TMI = top marginal income tax rate 
AEC = average effective capital gains tax rate 
TCO = top corporate tax rate 
CR = total revenue collected on capital gains 
ATI = average top income tax rate 
LTMI= top marginal tax rate lagged one year 
INEQ = income share of the top decile of income earners 
α = constant term 






 Table 2: Regressions and Expected Signs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Dependent 
Variables 
IR I I I I I I I I I I 
CR I I 
Independent 
Variables 
TMI (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
TMI^2 (-) (-) (-) 
INEQ (+) (+) 
LTMI (+) (+) (+) 
AEC (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
TCO (+) (+) (+) (+) 
ATI (+) 
GDP (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
 
Table (2) provides a template for the regressions that have been run for this thesis. The 
top row lists the number of each equation that is run. For each equation, the dependent variables 
have an “I” next to them if they are used as the dependent variable in a given regression. The 
independent variables have the expected sign next to them if they are included in a regression. If 
a space is left blank, this means that a given variable is not included in a specific regression. The 
GDP variable is used in every regression because GDP is directly related to tax revenue. As GDP 
changes, incomes change along with it. Changing incomes alter the tax revenue that the 
government receives. I control for GDP to account for changes in income tax revenue that cannot 
be accounted for with changes in the other independent variables. GDP is always expected to 




6. Regressions and Interpretations6: 
This section explores different theories about the relationship between tax rates and tax 
revenues. I test to see if the log-log functional form or the quadratic functional accurately 
captures this relationship.  
6.1 Log-log regressions: One functional form that could be relevant to the discussion of 
the results of behavioral responses to tax rate changes is the log-log functional form. It creates 
elasticities as coefficients for each variable, and unlike the Laffer curve, it is not based on the 
assumption that increasing tax rates lowers tax revenue if tax rates are above a critical point. 
Since the tax code in the U.S. has a series of marginal income tax rates, people could stop 
earning more money, but not necessarily actively earn less money and take more leisure time 
with income tax rate increases. Individuals might also switch income to a different form, such as 
capital income, so that it is subject to a different tax rate. The hypothesis concerning the 
following equations is that the Laffer curve does not exist in the U.S. and that there is a positive 
relation between tax rates and tax revenues.  
  The regression in equation (1) shows a log-log relationship between the dependent 
variable, income tax revenue (IR), and the independent variables, the top marginal income tax 
rate (TMI) and GDP. This is a baseline regression used to show that the income tax rate is 
positively related to income tax revenue. The coefficients for the top marginal income tax rate 
(TMI) and GDP are expected to be positively related to income tax revenue (IR). Since the log-
log functional form creates coefficients that are elasticities, the beta coefficient for the top 
marginal income tax rate (TMI) variable is the elasticity of tax revenue related to the top 
                                                 
6
 The regression output tables and a table with descriptive statistics for each variable are presented in the appendix.  
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marginal tax rate. It shows the percentage change in tax revenue that would result from a one 
percent change in marginal tax rates holding other variables constant. 
 
Equation 1: lnIR= α + β1lnTMI + β2lnGDP + εi   
 
IR = income tax revenue generated at or over the 29% marginal income tax rate 
TMI = top marginal income tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
The results of this regression are shown in table (4) in the appendix. The t-score for the 
top marginal tax rate is not significant in this case. The top marginal income tax rate (TMI) 
variable should be significant because it controls what percent of an individual’s income is 
received by the government as taxes. It could be the case that other relevant variables need to be 
included in the equation to improve the t-score. There also could have been errors with the data 
collection that affected the equation as well. The t-score for the GDP variable is significant so a 
change in GDP significantly affects tax revenue. A high adjusted r squared value of .919 
indicates that the equation fits the data very well. Theory would indicate that tax rates should 
have a strong influence on the amount of revenue received by the government. Although the top 
marginal tax rate is not significant in equation (1), other variables that also explain how much 
income tax revenue the government receives may need to be added to better assess the 
significance of that variable.  
Testing for Income switching: Capturing the relation between tax rates and tax revenue 
necessitates further research to better understand how individuals respond to tax changes, which 
involves exploring possible income switching between tax bases. In equation (2), the 
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independent variable, average effective capital gains tax rate (AEC), has been added to the 
regression because it might be an important factor in explaining the movement in income tax 
revenue (IR), and it could increase the significance of other variables. Adding this variable tests 
the hypothesis that individuals switch income from wage to capital gains tax bases when relative 
tax rates change. This step provides an extension of the work of Gordon and Slemrod (1998) by 
explaining movements in income tax revenue through income switching behaviors. The inclusion 
of this variable shows that people might switch the ways they receive income in order to be 
subject to a lower tax rate. The average effective capital gains tax rate (AEC) is expected to have 
a positive relationship to income tax revenue (IR) because, as the average effective capital gains 
tax rate (AEC) increases, individuals have a greater incentive to take their compensation as wage 
income, which would increase income tax revenue (IR). Conversely, if the average effective 
capital gains tax rate (AEC) decreases, individuals would have a greater incentive to take their 
income as capital gains, which would lower IR. 
 
Equation 2: lnIR= α + β1ln TMI + β2lnAEC + β3lnGDP + εi   
 
IR = income tax revenue generated at or over the 29% marginal income tax rate 
TMI = top marginal income tax rate 
AEC = average effective capital gains tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
The results of this regression are shown in table (5) in the appendix. The t-scores for both 
the top marginal income tax rate (TMI) and average effective capital gains tax rate (AEC) 
variables are not significant in this case. There could have been errors with the data collection or 
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omitted variables that affected the accuracy of this equation. The t-score for GDP is significant 
so a change in GDP significantly affects tax revenue. The high adjusted r squared value for this 
equation indicates that the regression fits the data very well.  
 Again, even though the top marginal tax rate and the average effective tax rate on capital 
gains are not significant in this equation, the addition of another important variable, the top 
corporate tax rate, could increase the significance of those two variables by further explaining 
income switching behavior.  
Equation (3) adds another independent variable, the top corporate tax rate (TCO), to the 
equation so that the movement in the dependent variable can be more accurately explained by the 
movement in the independent variables. This tests the hypothesis that individuals switch income 
between personal and corporate tax bases when relative tax rates change. Movements in the top 
corporate tax rate (TCO) variable could affect income tax revenue (IR) because individuals could 
shift income from corporate income to wage income depending on the respective tax rates. The 
top corporate tax rate (TCO) is expected to have a positive relationship to income tax revenue 
(IR) because as the top corporate tax rate (TCO) increases, individuals have a greater incentive to 
take their compensation as wage income, which would increase income tax revenue (IR). 
Conversely, if the top corporate tax rate (TCO) decreases, individuals would have a greater 
incentive to take their income as corporate income, which would lower income tax revenue (IR). 
 
Equation 3: lnIR= α + β1lnTMI + β2lnAEC + β3lnTCO+ β4lnGDP + εi 
 
IR = income tax revenue generated at or over the 29% marginal income tax rate 
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TMI = top marginal income tax rate 
AEC = average effective capital gains tax rate 
TCO  = top corporate tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
The results of this regression are shown in table (6) in the appendix. In this case the t-
score for the top marginal income tax rate (TMI) variable is significant. The inclusion of the top 
corporate tax rate (TCO) variable increases the significance of the top marginal income tax rate 
(TMI) variable since it is significant in this regression while it has not been significant in the 
previous log-log regressions. Still, the average effective capital gains tax rate (AEC) variable is 
not significant. This could possibly be explained by an omitted variable. There could also be 
errors with the data collection that affect the equation. The top corporate tax rate (TCO) variable 
is significant, but not in the direction that was initially expected. The negative sign on the 
coefficient in this case could be explained by actions outside of income switching. As the 
corporate income tax increases people could evade taxes by hiding their income from the IRS in 
some manner (Slemrod 2007). It is impossible to assess tax evasion accurately because most of it 
is hidden and cannot be measured so it cannot be included in a regression model. The t-score for 
GDP is significant so a change in GDP significantly affects tax revenue. A high adjusted r 
squared value indicates that the equation fits the data very well.     
It is possible that using a different variable as the dependent variable can show a stronger 
relationship between tax rates and tax revenues. Using capital gains tax revenue as the dependent 
variable in an equation instead of income tax revenue could lead to more accurate results because 
a different data set is being used to estimate the regression. It is also possible that individuals 
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treat capital gains income differently than wage income, which might lead to unique behavioral 
responses to tax rate changes that could affect tax revenue.  
Testing alternate dependent variables: The Laffer curve theory does not exclusively relate to 
income tax revenue. I am exploring whether the log-log form captures the relation between tax 
rates and capital gains tax revenue. Equation (7) uses the log-log form to explain the relationship 
between capital gains tax revenues (IR) and average effective capital gains tax rates (AEC) and 
GDP (independent variables). The average effective capital gains tax rate (AEC) should have a 
positive relation to capital gains revenue (CR) because, as the tax rate increases, the government 
should receive more revenue. This is similar to the regression relating income tax revenues to the 
marginal income tax rate and GDP, but there might be a relationship present with capital gains 
tax revenue as the dependent variable that is not present when income tax revenue is the 
dependent variable. This is because people can control when they receive income from capital 
gains since they choose when to sell an asset. Auerbach and Poterba (1988) show that capital 
gains realizations vary greatly directly before and directly after a tax reform. 
Equation 4: lnCR= α + β1lnAEC + β2lnGDP + εi 
 
CR = total revenue collected on capital gains 
AEC = average effective capital gains tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
The results of this regression are shown in table (7) in the appendix. In this case, the t-
scores for both the average effective capital gains tax rate and GDP are highly significant, and 
the adjusted r squared value is very high showing that the equation is an excellent fit for the data. 
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Again the log-log form has shown high explanatory power in modeling the relationship between 
tax rates and tax revenues.  
Even though this regression has shown significant results, it is necessary to include other 
variables to see if tax rates on other forms of income can explain changes in capital gains tax 
revenue. The inclusion of other tax rates as independent variables tests the hypothesis that 
income switching occurs between personal and capital gains tax bases. If the income tax rate can 
explain movements in capital gains tax revenue then there would be evidence of income 
switching behavior. The top marginal income tax rate (TMI) is included in equation (5) to 
account for these income switching behaviors. The top marginal income tax rate (TMI) should 
also have a positive relation to capital gains tax revenue (CR) because, as the marginal income 
tax rate rises, people might switch more of their wage income to capital gains income, which 
would increase the revenue from capital gains taxes. 
 
Equation 5: lnCR= α + β1lnAEC + β2lnTMI + β3lnGDP + εi 
 
CR = total revenue collected on capital gains 
AEC = average effective capital gains tax rate 
TMI = top marginal income tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
The results of this regression are shown in table (8) in the appendix. The t-score for GDP 
is still highly significant in this case. The t-score for average the effective capital gains tax rate, 
although still being significant, is less significant with the inclusion of the marginal tax rate 
variable. The t-score for the marginal tax rate variable is not significant. This could possibly be 
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explained by an omitted variable or the erroneous inclusion of the marginal tax rate variable in a 
regression where it does not have explanatory power. There could also be errors with the data 
collection that affect the equation. Although the adjusted r-squared value is still high, the top 
marginal income tax rate is insignificant so this equation cannot conclusively show evidence of 
income switching behavior.  
  
Testing average tax rates: It is possible that a different representation of the income tax variable 
could more accurately explain movements in income tax revenue. The formatting of the income 
tax variable, if changed, might be able to better reflect income switching behavior. Equation (6) 
uses income tax revenue as the dependent variable and the average individual income tax for the 
highest quintile (ATI), the average effective capital gains tax rate (AEC), the highest corporate 
tax rate (TCO), and GDP as independent variables. All of the independent variables are expected 
to be positively related to income tax revenue. The average effective capital gains tax rate (AEC) 
and the highest corporate tax rate (TCO) are included to account for income switching behaviors. 
The data from this regression differs from the data used in the previous regressions because data 
was only available back to 1979 instead of 1958. This fact could possibly account for some of 
the variation in the results of this regression. 
 
Equation 6: lnIR= α + β1lnATI + β2lnAEC + β3lnTCO+ β4lnGDP + εi 
 
IR = income tax revenue generated at or over the 29% marginal income tax rate 
ATI = average top income tax rate 
AEC = average affective capital gains tax rate 
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TCO  = top corporate tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
The results of this regression are shown in table (9) in the appendix. The t-scores are 
significant for both the average income tax and GDP in this regression. The t-score for the 
highest corporate tax rate is significant, but in this regression the value is positive, which differed 
from its negative value in equation (3). This could be accounted for by the smaller data set or the 
use of average income tax rates instead of top marginal tax rates. The t-score for the average 
effective capital gains tax rate was not significant possibly because of an omitted variable, errors 
with data collection, or a mis-specified variable. The adjusted r-squared value is still high, which 
shows that the equation fits the data well. Since the top corporate tax rate (TCO) variable is 
highly significant, this regression shows evidence of income switching behaviors between 
personal and corporate tax bases.  
Testing lagged tax rates: So far, tax revenue received by the government in one year has been 
compared to tax rates from the same year. It might be the case, however, that individuals are 
unable to react instantly to tax rate changes. This applies mostly to changes in marginal income 
tax rates because it might be extremely difficult to alter one’s wage income right after a tax 
change occurs. Since this process might not be immediate, lagging the marginal income tax rate 
by one year might better capture when people decide to change the form in, which they receive 
their income because of a tax rate change. This addition could lead to more significant regression 
results. It is also possible that individuals could react before tax changes occur, but there is little 
evidence to support this reaction to income tax rate changes. Saez (2004) also points out that 
taxpayers imperfectly control their incomes or are not aware of details in the tax code. These 
factors could contribute to a delayed response to tax rate changes.  
48 
 
Although Romer and Romer (2007) use lags of four to five years in their paper, there are 
marked differences in this research that make a one year lag more suitable. The most important 
difference is that I study tax revenue while Romer and Romer (2007) study economic output 
which, is a far more complex variable. I also ran regressions with lags of one to three years and 
the one year lag was the only one that had significant results. This could show that the likelihood 
that someone would shift income as time goes on decreases every year after a tax reform. 
Equation (7) shows the relationship between income tax revenue as the dependent 
variable and GDP and the top marginal income tax rate with a one year lag (LTMI). The top 
marginal tax rate lagged one year (LTMI) is expected to have a positive relation to IR since an 
increase in tax rates should increase tax revenue. 
 
Equation 7: lnIR= α  β1lnLTMI + β2lnGDP + εi 
 
IR = income tax revenue generated at or over the 29% marginal income tax rate 
LTMI= top marginal tax rate lagged one year 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
The results of this regression are shown in table (10) in the appendix. In this case, the top 
marginal tax rate lagged one year (LTMI) is not significant, which could be explained by an 
omitted variable or an error in the data. The regression still has a very high adjusted r squared 
value, which shows that it fits the actual data very well. The values of the coefficients are both 
positive as expected. 
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The inclusion of another independent variable could increase the explanatory power of 
the previous regression and increase the explanatory ability of the top marginal tax rate lagged 
one year (LTMI). Equation (8) adds another independent variable, average effective capital gains 
tax rates, to the regression equation to complement the lagged top marginal income tax rate and 
GDP. This variable is included to test the hypothesis that income switching occurs between wage 
and capital gains tax bases when relative tax rates change. As in previous regressions, the value 
of the average effective capital gains tax rate (AEC) coefficient should be positively related to 
income tax revenue (IR). 
 
Equation 8: lnIR= α  β1lnLTMI + β2lnAEC + β3lnGDP + εi 
 
IR = income tax revenue generated at or over the 29% marginal income tax rate 
LTMI= top marginal tax rate lagged one year 
AEC = average effective capital gains tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
The results of this regression are shown in table (11) in the appendix. All of the t-scores 
of the independent variables are significant although to varying degrees. The inclusion of the 
new variable increases the t-scores of the other variables as well as slightly increasing the 
adjusted r-squared value improving the overall fit of the regression. This regression shows 
evidence that individuals shift income between capital gains and wages as a response to changes 
in taxes that make one form of income more favorable than the other.  
Controlling for Inequality: The coefficient for the lagged top marginal tax rate (LTMI) variable 
in equation (8) is higher than expected at 1.6. This result shows that a one percent change in tax 
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rate causes a 1.6 percent change in tax revenue. Since people most likely do not increase the 
amount of income they report when tax rates are raised, there could be another variable that 
could account for tax revenue movement. Increases in inequality, with top earners gaining a 
larger income share, could explain the large coefficient of the lagged top marginal tax rate 
(LTMI) variable. In what follows, I include data on the income share of the top decile of income 
earners in the regression7. I use this variable (INEQ) as a proxy for inequality, which could 
account for some tax revenue movement. I expect this variable to have a positive relation to 
income tax revenue because I expect tax revenue of high income taxpayers to increase as their 
share of total income grows.  
 
Equation 9: lnIR= α  β1lnLTMI + β2lnINEQ + β3lnAEC + β3lnGDP + εi 
 
IR = income tax revenue generated at or over the 29% marginal income tax rate 
LTMI= top marginal tax rate lagged one year 
INEQ = income share of the top decile of income earners 
AEC = average effective capital gains tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
The results of this regression are shown in table (12) in the appendix. The added variable, 
the income share of the top decile of income earners (INEQ), is negatively correlated to tax 
revenue. This could reflect the ability of higher income earners to avoid taxes as their incomes 
increase. The inclusion of the income share of the top decile of income earners (INEQ) did 
significantly reduce the coefficient on the lagged top marginal tax rate (LTMI) variable to 1.15 





so the desired effect was produced in this equation. All of the variables are significant in this 
equation and the R squared value is very high so both the full equation and the individual 
variables can accurately explain movements in the data. 
 
 
6.2 Quadratic regressions: The following regressions are intended to model the Laffer 
curve based on tax data for the U.S. Unlike the log-log functional form, the quadratic functional 
form tests if there is a negative relationship between tax rates and tax revenues beyond a certain 
tax rate as Laffer curve theory would predict. These equations test this central hypothesis while 
also taking steps similar to the previous regressions in order to capture income switching 
behavior.  
Equation (10) is derived from the work of Canto et al. (1981). This equation is intended 
to show that as tax rates increase, there is a point where an increase in tax rates no longer 
increase tax revenue and tax revenue actually decreases as tax rates are raised. The coefficient 
for the top marginal income tax rate (TMI) should be positively related to income tax revenue 
(IR) since the Laffer curve theory says that increased tax rates increase revenue up to a certain 
point. The top marginal income tax rate squared (TMI2) variable should have a negative relation 
to IR because this variable shows that after a certain point, increased tax rates decreases tax 
revenue. If the top marginal income tax rate squared (TMI2) variable is negative and significant 
then there is evidence that increasing tax rates have negative effects on income tax revenues 
when tax rates are high.  




IR = income tax revenue generated at or over the 29% marginal income tax rate 
TMI = top marginal income tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
The results of this regression are shown in table (13) in the appendix. This simple 
regression does not support the Laffer curve theory because the t-scores for the top marginal 
income tax rate (TMI) and the top marginal income tax rate squared (TMI2) variables are not 
significant. There are several possible reasons why the coefficients of this regression are not 
significant. It is possible that the t-scores are not significant because some important variables 
were omitted. There could also have been data inaccuracies that have decreased the significance 
of certain variables. The t-score for GDP is significant so a change in GDP significantly affects 
tax revenue. The high adjusted r squared value does show a relatively strong overall fit for the 
regression. This can occur if all of the variables together can explain movement in the dependent 
variable, but they cannot do so individually.  
Adding Relevant Variables: Since variables representing tax rates other than the income tax rate 
and inequality were significant in the log-log regressions, including them in the quadratic 
regressions could improve the significance of the quadratic functional form. Equation (11) 
attempts to expand on the original quadratic regression presented that represents the Laffer curve 
by including more variables that should help to explain movements in income tax revenue. 
Omitting an important variable can bias the results of the variables included in a regression so it 
is important to try and include all relevant variables. The average effective capital gains tax rate 
(AEC) variable controls for income switching between wage and capital gains income while the 
top corporate tax rate (TCO) variable controls for income switching between corporate and wage 
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income. The values for all coefficients should be positive except for coefficient for the top 




Equation 11: IR= α + β1TMI + β2(TMI)2 + β3AEC + β4TCO + β5GDP + εi 
 
IR = income tax revenue generated at or over the 29% marginal income tax rate 
TMI = top marginal income tax rate 
AEC = average effective capital gains tax rate 
TCO = top corporate tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
The results of this regression are shown in table (14) in the appendix. In this case, two 
variables have significant t-scores: the top corporate tax rate (TCO) and GDP. The other 
variables have insignificant t-scores. Although the adjusted r squared value is still relatively 
high, the fact that two out of the five variables included are significant shows that this functional 
form is most likely not the best way to represent the relationship between tax rates and tax 
revenues. One would expect that the top marginal income tax rate squared (TMI2) variable would 
be significant in this equation, but it is not. This variable is highly important to the validity the 
Laffer curve theory because it represents the effect of excess taxation, which gives individuals 
the incentive to work less. If the Laffer curve theory is valid, this variable should have a 
significant effect on tax revenue.  
Controlling for Inequality: Since the proxy used to represent inequality increased the accuracy of 
equation (9), it is possible that including it in an equation representing the Laffer curve could 
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have the same effect. I expect this variable to have a positive relation to income tax revenue 
because I expect tax revenue of high income taxpayers to increase as their share of total income 
grows.  
Equation 12: IR= α + β1TMI + β2(TMI)2 + β3AEC + β4TCO + β5INEQ + β6GDP + εi 
 
IR = income tax revenue generated at or over the 29% marginal income tax rate 
TMI = top marginal income tax rate 
AEC = average effective capital gains tax rate 
TCO = top corporate tax rate 
INEQ = income share of the top decile of income earners 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
The results of this regression are shown in table (15) in the Appendix. As in equation 
(11), the top corporate tax rate variable has a significant t-score. The average effective capital 
gains tax rate (AEC) and the proxy for inequality (INEQ) also have significant t-scores. Adding 
the (INEQ) variable to this equation, however, made the GDP variable insignificant, which is 
puzzling because it has been significant in every previous regression and theory would indicate 
that it should significantly affect tax revenue. Although the adjusted r squared value is relatively 
high in this equation, adding the (INEQ) variable still does not make the top marginal income tax 
rate (TMI) or the top marginal income tax rate squared (TMI2) variables significant. The 
variable, top marginal income tax rate squared (TMI2), that is included to make the regression 
resemble the Laffer curve does not have a significant t-score. Therefore the Laffer curve theory 
that states that tax rates can have a negative relationship to tax revenue cannot be strongly 
supported.   
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 Table (16) in the appendix provides descriptive statistics for all of the variables that were 
included in the various regressions. It provides information on the number of observations, the 
mean values, and the distribution with respect to the mean for each variable. Table (3) below 
provides a summary of all of the regressions run for this project. The numbers in the top row 
refer to the number of the regression equation. The column on the left shows all of the variables 
that are included in the regressions. If a variable is included in a regression, the table shows if 
that variable is not significant if the letters (NS) are present. If a variable is included in a 
regression and is significant, then the coefficient value is displayed in the cell.  
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
TMI NS NS 1.6   NS         NS NS NS 
TMI^2                   NS NS NS 
INEQ                 -4.17     1.50E+07 
LTMI             NS 1.6 1.15       
AEC   NS NS 0.79 0.78 NS   0.79 0.73   NS -4.32E+06 
TCO     -2.45     1.62         4.19E+06 -5.52E+06 
ATI           1.97             
GDP 2.91 3.02 2.39 2.6 2.58 2.1 3.36 3.61 4.48 38395 32630 NS 
 
Table (3) gives a comparison of the significance of variables used in the regressions. In all of the 
quadratic regressions, equations (10) to (12), the top marginal income tax rate (TMI) and top 
marginal income tax rate squared (TMI2) variables are not significant. This shows that the 
quadratic model does not adequately explain the relationship between income tax rates and 
revenues in these instances. The top corporate tax rate variable (TCO) is significant in all of the 
regressions where it is used, but its sign switches between regressions. Therefore the effects of 
this variable cannot be accurately interpreted since the sign of the variable is not consistent. 
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Adding variables to explain income switching behaviors increases the significance of the top 
marginal income tax rate (TMI) and lagged top marginal tax rate (LTMI) variables in the 
logarithmic regressions. Including variables to account for income switching is important for 




Although the research conducted in this paper does not totally discredit the notion of the 
Laffer curve, it shows that it is not the most accurate way to model the relationship between tax 
revenue and tax rates in the U.S. The top marginal income tax rate variable (TMI) and the top 
marginal income tax rate squared variable (TMI2) were not significant in the regressions 
modeling the Laffer curve whereas they support the essential underpinnings of the Laffer curve 
theory. If these variables were significant they could explain the shape of the Laffer curve, which 
resembles an upside down parabola. Since they are not significant this theory cannot be given 
significant support.  
 Every log-log regression that was run has a high R squared value, which shows that the 
log-log functional form can be used to accurately depict the relationship between tax rates and 
tax revenues. Out of all of these equations, equation (3) and equation (9) stand out because of the 
significance of the individual variables that the regressions contain. The residual plots for both of 
these regressions are shown below in figure (2) and figure (3). The y-axis for both plots 
represents the actual tax revenue for every year while the x-axis represents the tax revenue 
predicted by the regression equation. The points on the graph show the actual tax revenue for 
every given year while the line on the graph is the regression line I create. These figures provide 
a visual representation of how well the regressions fit the actual data by presenting the actual 
data points and the regression equation in the same graph. The significance of multiple variables 
in these log-log regressions points to a linear relation between tax revenues and tax rates. In 
equation (3) both the top marginal income tax rate and the top corporate tax rate are highly 
significant even though the coefficient value for the top corporate tax rate was not expected to be 
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negative. In equation (9) the lagged top marginal tax rate variable is highly significant while the 
average effective capital gains tax rate variable is significant as well. These variables explain 
movements in income tax revenue in log-log regressions while they did not in quadratic 
regressions. The variable representing inequality is significant as well. The results of these 
regressions show that individuals respond to tax rate changes but not in the same ways that the 
Laffer curve theory would predict. Instead of changing their labor supply, which rarely happens 
according to Goolsbee (1999), high income taxpayers switch the form in, which they receive 
their income. 






























































 Many scholars such as Feldstein (1995) have pointed to the importance of elasticities for 
interpreting the effects of tax rate changes on taxable income and therefore tax revenue. The log-
log functional form conveniently calculates elasticities as the coefficients that represent how 
each independent variable affects income tax revenue. As I mentioned previously, the elasticities 
created through this research show the direct revenue effects of a change in the top marginal 
income tax rate. For equation (3) the elasticity of income tax revenue with respect to the top 
marginal income tax rate is near 1.6. (this is a positive elasticity). This elasticity shows that a one 
percent increase in the marginal income tax rate would cause a subsequent increase in tax 
revenue of 1.6 percent. The fact that the elasticity is greater than one is surprising since 
individuals would not have the incentive to switch more income to wage form if the tax rate 
increases. Increased income inequality as evidenced by Atkinson et al. (2009) could have 
contributed to rising tax revenue unrelated to tax rate changes. Therefore, I use a variable to 
represent inequality in equation (9), and the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to the tax rate 
is reduced to 1.15. Although this elasticity is still above one, increasing the accuracy of the data 
relating to tax revenue and inequality could lower the value of this elasticity. Based on this 
research, increasing marginal tax rates on high income taxpayers is an effective way to raise 
government revenue.  
These results contradict the findings of both Feldstein (1995) and Lindsey (1987) because 
their research shows that a tax rate increase would lead to little or no revenue for the 
government.  One factor to take into consideration is that I calculate a long-run elasticity for top 
income earners based on forty eight years of data. Feldstein and Lindsey only examine the years 
surrounding the tax reforms put in place in 1982, 1984, and 1986. It is possible that during the 
years after a tax rate change, individuals take part in behaviors that would lower government 
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revenue while in the long run, government revenue increases. My research, however, points out 
that these behaviors do not describe long-term responses to taxation exhibited by high income 
earners since 1958. Another reason why my research could differ from that of Feldstein (1995) 
and Lindsey (1987) is that I use a different method to calculate elasticities. They use a 
difference-in differences calculation, which Goolsbee (1999) says can bias elasticity measures 
because it compares different income groups. The regression method that I use tries to isolate 
and then compare the same income group over time. Lastly, my use of an imperfect measure of 
income tax revenue could have inflated my elasticity estimates to make them significantly 
different from those of Feldstein (1995) and Lindsey (1987).  
 This research provides other valuable information that can have an impact on policy 
measures that seek to reform taxes by shedding insight on revenue effects of behavioral 
responses to taxation. Equations (8) and (9) provide the most important information on this 
subject. First, the significance of the lagged marginal tax rate variable shows that individuals do 
not respond immediately to tax rate changes. It takes people some time to adjust their working or 
earning tendencies in reaction to a tax rate change. Assessing the year when a tax rate change 
occurs might not produce results showing responsiveness, not because people do not respond, 
but because they have not yet had the time to do so. During any given year, income tax revenue 
could be better explained by the previous year’s tax rate than the current year’s tax rate. If policy 
makers are looking for evidence of behavioral responses to taxation they should wait for two, 
three, or four years after a tax measure is passed to fully gauge its impact.  
 Another important aspect of equations (8) and (9) is that the capital gains tax rate can 
significantly explain movements in income tax revenue. This might seem bizarre at first because 
the capital gains tax rate does not apply to wage income, but this finding is in keeping with the 
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results of Gordon and Slemrod (1998). They show that the top half of income earners switch 
income from corporate to personal tax bases when personal income receives a favorable tax rate. 
This result is also supported by Piketty et al. (2011) who show that optimizing tax rates requires 
attention to elasticities relating to labor supply, tax avoidance, and compensation bargaining. 
These scholars show that raising tax revenue is a complex process that involves multiple types of 
behavioral responses to taxation, and my results confirm their findings. Since the capital gains 
tax rate can explain some of the movement of income tax revenue, my results show that income 
switching behavior can occur between wage income and capital gains income. This finding is 
very important for the ramifications of any change in income taxes on income tax revenue. 
Policy makers need to assume that if the income tax rate is raised and the capital gains tax rate is 
lower than the income tax rate, high income individuals switch their earnings to capital gains 
income to some degree. The amount of income tax revenue that is collected shrinks because of 
this behavioral response, but it does not represent a decrease in labor supply. Since people switch 
income from one tax base to another, the government still receives some tax revenue when 
income is switched to a different income form. The difference is that the government receives 
less total revenue when income is switched to be taxed at a lower rate. Policy makers need to be 
aware that this income switching behavior occurs if a tax rate change makes a certain rate higher 





The evidence presented in this paper adds substance to the heated debate on the revenue 
effects of tax rate changes. Whenever politicians propose tax rate changes, there is a bitter 
argument about the effects they will have on government revenue. One side claims that 
increasing taxes could actually lower government revenue while the opposition says that tax 
revenue will increase as a result. Since there is such a stark political divide concerning these 
effects, studying tax return data is essential to determine the actual repercussions of tax rate 
changes. The Laffer curve theory is a commonly cited model involving individual responses to 
tax rate changes. Testing this theory to see if its predictions actually match data trends can 
therefore be useful for policy making.  
The results of my econometric analysis of high income earners show that the Laffer curve 
theory does not seem to accurately represent the evolution of government revenue. Since the 
quadratic regressions representing the Laffer curve are not significant, the claim that government 
revenue decreases when tax rates increase does not seem to be supported empirically. By 
contrast, Equation (9), which is a log-log regression, contains variables that significantly affect 
government revenue. In this equation the lagged top marginal tax rate variable is statistically 
significant. The elasticity of tax revenue related to the top marginal tax rate that is generated in 
this regression indicates that tax rate increases are positively related to increases in tax revenue. I 
find that an increase in the top marginal income tax rate of 1% causes income tax revenue to 
increase by more than 1%.  
This finding is consistent with the estimates made by Saez (2004) and Goolsbee (1999) 
who show that raising tax rates increases government revenue. It does not support the research of 
Feldstein (1995) and Lindsey (1987) who say that tax increases could have a negligible or 
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negative effect on tax revenue. As noted in the discussion, it is unusual that the elasticity is 
greater than one. Including a variable to represent the effects of inequality reduces this elasticity, 
and more accurate inequality specification could potentially bring its value under one. The other 
key finding of equation (9) is that the capital gains tax rate can significantly explain movements 
in income tax revenue. This shows that individuals take part in income switching behavior when 
the top marginal income tax rate changes relative to the capital gains tax rate. The direction of 
this income switching depends on the direction of the tax change.  
These results provide important insights into the effects that policy makers need to 
consider when proposing tax rate changes If the federal government needs to raise additional 
revenue then increasing tax rates on top income earners seems like an effective way to 
accomplish this goal. Inversely, tax cuts decrease income tax revenue so tax cuts are not revenue 
neutral. Lawmakers also need to keep in mind that income switching behavior occurs when the 
capital gains tax rate is changed. This means that tax rate changes have repercussions other than 
just raising or lowering revenue associated with a single tax rate. If taxable income decreases 
after the top marginal income tax rate increases, some of this income is claimed as capital gains 
income. To mitigate the effects of this income switching, income and capital gains tax rates 
could be raised or lowered at the same time. The research presented in this thesis can guide 
policy makers so that they can accurately predict the effects of proposed tax reforms.  
It is possible, however, that the Laffer curve might be better suited to show the revenue 
effects of behavioral responses to tax rate changes under a different tax code. If there was a flat 
tax imposed in the U.S. instead of a progressive tax, there might be a revenue maximizing tax 
rate supporting the Laffer curve theory. In the future others can expand on my research by 
collecting tax revenue data on a sample of the same high income earners over many years. This 
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would isolate the revenue effects of behavioral responses of high income earners. Including a 
variable to represent the income share of a more precise group of individuals could give a better 
representation of the effects of inequality on revenue. Studying other countries with higher tax 
rates might lend more validity to the Laffer curve theory. If tax rates are raised high enough in 
another country or if there is a flat tax rate structure, individuals could significantly reduce their 
labor supply, which would lower tax revenue. Further research could also include various 
measures of income inequality over time, since accounting for inequality seems to significantly 
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This appendix contains the regression outputs for all of the regressions that were run for this 
thesis as well as a table of descriptive statistics including each variable used in the regressions.  
Table 4: Results of Equation 1 
Model 4: OLS, (N = 48) 
Dependent variable: IR 
HAC standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -9.89 5.67 -1.74 0.08792 * 
lnTMI 0.54 0.54 1.00 0.32422  
lnGDP 2.91 0.40 7.19 <0.00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  18.06  S.D. dependent var  1.35 
Sum squared resid  6.67  S.E. of regression  0.39 
R-squared  0.922  Adjusted R-squared  0.919 
F(2, 45)  185.05  P-value(F)  1.95e-22 
Log-likelihood -20.75  Akaike criterion  47.50 
Schwarz criterion  53.12  Hannan-Quinn  49.62 
rho  0.90  Durbin-Watson  0.19 
 
IR = income tax revenue generated at or over the 29% marginal income tax rate, the variable data 
is presented in thousands of dollars (dependent variable) 
TMI = top marginal income tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
Table 5: Results of Equation 2 
Model 6: OLS, (N = 48) 
Dependent variable: IR 
HAC standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -13.35 7.13 -1.87 0.06801 * 
lnTMI 0.81 0.64 1.27 0.21244  
lnAEC 0.50 0.44 1.14 0.25852  




Mean dependent var  18.06  S.D. dependent var  1.35 
Sum squared resid  6.41  S.E. of regression  0.38 
R-squared  0.925  Adjusted R-squared  0.920 
F(3, 44)  159.00  P-value(F)  1.25e-23 
Log-likelihood -19.77  Akaike criterion  47.54 
Schwarz criterion  55.03  Hannan-Quinn  50.37 
rho  0.87  Durbin-Watson  0.22 
 
IR = income tax revenue generated at or over the 29% marginal income tax rate, the variable data 
is presented in thousands of dollars (dependent variable) 
TMI = top marginal income tax rate 
AEC = average effective capital gains tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
Table 6: Results of Equation 3 
Model 7: OLS, (N = 48) 
Dependent variable: IR 
HAC standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 0.34 8.84 0.04 0.96932  
lnTMI 1.60 0.55 2.89 0.00607 *** 
lnAEC -0.03 0.54 -0.07 0.94838  
lnTCO -2.54 0.89 -2.84 0.00688 *** 
lnGDP 2.39 0.45 5.31 <0.00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  18.06  S.D. dependent var  1.35 
Sum squared resid  5.18  S.E. of regression  0.35 
R-squared  0.939  Adjusted R-squared  0.934 
F(4, 43)  154.62  P-value(F)  6.35e-25 
Log-likelihood -14.68  Akaike criterion  39.36 
Schwarz criterion  48.72  Hannan-Quinn  42.90 
rho  0.83  Durbin-Watson  0.34 
 
IR = income tax revenue generated at or over the 29% marginal income tax rate, the variable data 
is presented in thousands of dollars (dependent variable) 
TMI = top marginal income tax rate 
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AEC = average effective capital gains tax rate 
TCO  = top corporate tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
Table 7: Results of Equation 4 
Model 9: OLS, (N = 48) 
Dependent variable: CR 
HAC standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -15.69 0.97 -16.19 <0.00001 *** 
lnAEC 0.79 0.34 2.30 0.02625 ** 
lnGDP 2.60 0.12 21.20 <0.00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  9.62  S.D. dependent var  1.42 
Sum squared resid  4.80  S.E. of regression  0.33 
R-squared  0.949  Adjusted R-squared  0.947 
F(2, 45)  362.56  P-value(F)  1.78e-28 
Log-likelihood -12.84  Akaike criterion  31.67 
Schwarz criterion  37.29  Hannan-Quinn  33.79 
rho  0.65  Durbin-Watson  0.74 
 
CR = total revenue collected on capital gains, the variable data is presented in millions of dollars 
(dependent variable) 
AEC = average effective capital gains tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
Table 8: Results of Equation 5 
 
Model 10: OLS, (N = 48) 
Dependent variable: CR 
HAC standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -15.37 3.65 -4.21 0.00012 *** 
lnAEC 0.78 0.37 2.08 0.04364 ** 
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lnTMI -0.0008 0.008 -0.09 0.92743  
lnGDP 2.58 0.32 8.07 <0.00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  9.62  S.D. dependent var  1.42 
Sum squared resid  4.80  S.E. of regression  0.33 
R-squared  0.949  Adjusted R-squared  0.946 
F(3, 44)  238.95  P-value(F)  3.06e-27 
Log-likelihood -12.83  Akaike criterion  33.66 
Schwarz criterion  41.15  Hannan-Quinn  36.49 
rho  0.65  Durbin-Watson  0.75 
 
CR = total revenue collected on capital gains, the variable data is presented in millions of dollars 
(dependent variable) 
AEC = average effective capital gains tax rate 
TMI = top marginal income tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
Table 9: Results of Equation 6 
Model 2: OLS, (N = 28) 
Dependent variable: IR 
HAC standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -10.88 5.06 -2.15 0.04222 ** 
lnATI 1.97 0.38 6.16 <0.00001 *** 
lnAEC -0.24 0.28 -0.86 0.40028  
lnTCO 1.62 0.58 2.82 0.00963 *** 
lnGDP 2.10 0.28 7.41 <0.00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  19.11  S.D. dependent var  0.47 
Sum squared resid  0.32  S.E. of regression  0.12 
R-squared  0.945  Adjusted R-squared  0.935 
F(4, 23)  180.56  P-value(F)  5.16e-17 
Log-likelihood  22.83  Akaike criterion -35.66 
Schwarz criterion -29.00  Hannan-Quinn -33.62 
rho  0.38  Durbin-Watson  0.96 
 
IR = income tax revenue generated at or over the 29% marginal income tax rate, the variable data 
is presented in thousands of dollars (dependent variable) 
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ATI = average top income tax 
AEC = average affective capital gains tax rate 
TCO  = top corporate tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
Table 10: Results of Equation 7 
Model 2: OLS, (N = 45) 
Dependent variable: IR 
HAC standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -16.10 7.28 -2.21 0.03245 ** 
lnLTMI 1.08 0.70 1.53 0.13313  
lnGDP 3.36 0.51 6.55 <0.00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  18.20  S.D. dependent var  1.29 
Sum squared resid  5.84  S.E. of regression  0.37 
R-squared  0.920  Adjusted R-squared  0.916 
F(2, 42)  141.63  P-value(F)  2.14e-19 
Log-likelihood -17.93  Akaike criterion  41.86 
Schwarz criterion  47.28  Hannan-Quinn  43.88 
rho  0.91  Durbin-Watson  0.20 
 
IR = income tax revenue generated at or over the 29% marginal income tax rate, the variable data 
is presented in thousands of dollars (dependent variable) 
LTMI= top marginal tax rate lagged 1 year 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
Table 11: Results of Equation 8 
Model 3: OLS, (N = 45) 
Dependent variable: IR 
HAC standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -22.66 7.83 -2.89 0.00609 *** 
lnLTMI 1.61 0.73 2.2 0.03301 ** 
lnAEC 0.79 0.40 1.99 0.05362 * 
73 
 
lnGDP 3.61 0.48 7.49 <0.00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  18.20  S.D. dependent var  1.29 
Sum squared resid  5.22  S.E. of regression  0.36 
R-squared  0.929  Adjusted R-squared  0.923 
F(3, 41)  167.68  P-value(F)  4.81e-23 
Log-likelihood -15.38  Akaike criterion  38.77 
Schwarz criterion  46.00  Hannan-Quinn  41.46 
rho  0.84  Durbin-Watson  0.32 
 
IR = income tax revenue generated at or over the 29% marginal income tax rate, the variable data 
is presented in thousands of dollars (dependent variable) 
LTMI= top marginal tax rate lagged 1 year 
AEC = average effective capital gains tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
Table 12: Results of Equation 9 
Model 1: OLS, (N = 45) 
Dependent variable: IR 
HAC standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -13.40 6.51 -2.06 0.04601 ** 
lnLTMI 1.15 0.51 2.23 0.03167 ** 
lnINEQ -4.17 1.96 -2.13 0.03915 ** 
lnAEC 0.72 0.28 2.64 0.01189 ** 
lnGDP 4.48 0.60 7.50 <0.00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  18.20  S.D. dependent var  1.29 
Sum squared resid  3.85  S.E. of regression  0.31 
R-squared  0.947  Adjusted R-squared  0.942 
F(4, 40)  102.75  P-value(F)  1.74e-20 
Log-likelihood -8.53  Akaike criterion  27.07 
Schwarz criterion  36.10  Hannan-Quinn  30.43 
rho  0.75  Durbin-Watson  0.42 
 
IR = income tax revenue generated at or over the 29% marginal income tax rate, the variable data 
is presented in thousands of dollars (dependent variable) 
LTMI= top marginal tax rate lagged 1 year 
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INEQ = income share of the top decile of income earners 
AEC = average effective capital gains tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
Table 13: Results of Equation 10 
 
Model 1: OLS, (N = 48) 
Dependent variable: IR 
HAC standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 2.97e+08 8.88e+07 -3.34 0.00170 *** 
TMI 2.91e+06 2.13e+06 1.37 0.17757  
TMI2 -11324.2 15963.7 -0.71 0.48184  
GDP 38395.5 4112.13 9.34 <0.00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  1.37e+08  S.D. dependent var  1.26e+08 
Sum squared resid  5.78e+16  S.E. of regression  36236491 
R-squared  0.923  Adjusted R-squared  0.918 
F(3, 44)  92.52  P-value(F)  4.98e-19 
Log-likelihood -901.49  Akaike criterion  1810.98 
Schwarz criterion  1818.46  Hannan-Quinn  1813.81 
rho  0.68  Durbin-Watson  0.65 
 
IR = income tax revenue generated at or over the 29% marginal income tax rate, the variable data 
is presented in thousands of dollars (dependent variable) 
TMI = top marginal income tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
Table 14: Results of Equation 11 
Model 2: OLS, (N = 48) 
Dependent variable: IR 
HAC standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 1.03e+08 1.75e+08 -0.59 0.55863  
TMI 5.44e+06 3.28e+06 1.66 0.10510  
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TMI2 -22575.2 19081.1 -1.18 0.24342  
AEC 2.88e+06 2.83e+06 -1.02 0.31492  
TCO 4.20e+06 1.60455e+06 -2.62 0.01233 ** 
GDP 32630.3 5376.74 6.07 <0.00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  1.37e+08  S.D. dependent var  1.26e+08 
Sum squared resid  4.97e+16  S.E. of regression  34411520 
R-squared  0.934  Adjusted R-squared  0.926 
F(5, 42)  67.89  P-value(F)  5.05e-19 
Log-likelihood -897.89  Akaike criterion  1807.78 
Schwarz criterion  1819.01  Hannan-Quinn  1812.03 
rho  0.58  Durbin-Watson  0.84 
 
IR = income tax revenue generated at or over the 29% marginal income tax rate, the variable data 
is presented in thousands of dollars (dependent variable) 
TMI = top marginal income tax rate 
AEC = average effective capital gains tax rate 
TCO  = top corporate tax rate 
GDP = gross domestic product 
 
Table 15: Results of Equation 12 
Model 2: OLS, (T = 48) 
Dependent variable: IR 
HAC standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -2.63e+08 2.48e+08 -1.8841 0.06665 * 
TMI 5.17e+06 4.40e+06 1.61 0.11032  
TMI2 -34393.5 25023.5 -1.44 0.13208  
AEC -4.32e+06 2.67e+06 -1.99 0.05315 * 
CORP -5.52e+06 1.70e+06 -3.24 0.00239 *** 
INEQ 1.50e+07 6.42e+06 2.34 0.02452 ** 
GDP 12479.3 9750.35 1.28 0.20778  
 
Mean dependent var  1.37e+08  S.D. dependent var  1.26e+08 
Sum squared resid  4.56e+16  S.E. of regression  33366587 
R-squared  0.93  Adjusted R-squared  0.93 
F(6, 41)  83.70  P-value(F)  2.06e-21 
Log-likelihood -895.83  Akaike criterion  1805.67 
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Schwarz criterion  1818.77  Hannan-Quinn  1810.62 
rho  0.58  Durbin-Watson  0.85 
 
Table 16: Table of descriptive statistics for all variables 
The top row of this table displays all of the variables used in the regressions for this thesis. The 
first column displays the various calculations that were made for each variable.  
 
    TMI TMI^2 INEQ LTMI AEC TCO ATI 
GDP (in 
billions) 




Observations 48 48 47 47 48 48 28 48 48 48 
Min 31 961 31.51 31 13.6 34 13.4 2919.5 7.91 1.3 
Max 91 8281 45.96 91 25.5 64 17.6 14996.1 390.71 137.14 
Mean 56.94 3626.22 36.61 57.4 16.97 47.96 15.2 8038.65 136.77 33.9 
Standard 
Deviation 19.81 8281 5.22 19.76 3.33 12.27 1.19 3879.86 126.17 38.2 
 
 
